MEMORY OF THE HOLOCAUST AND THE SHAPING OF JEWISH IDENTITY IN ISRAEL

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This paper examines the general trends and turning points in the construction of Jewish memory and identity in Israel as influenced by and based on the events of the Holocaust. The chapter will show the importance, as a factor in identity formation, of the slow and gradual evolution from the often rejected traumatic post-Holocaust memory, through the process of the social internalization and integration of this memory, to the current institutionalized memory. This process in Israel is connected with generation change from the first generation of eyewitnesses of the Holocaust, through the second generation of new Zionist citizens, to the third and fourth generations looking for its identity in the globalized world.

This paper is rooted in political science and will try to determine (a) how memory of past events is represented by and influences the contemporary political and social life of a democratic country; (b) the role of remembrance in achieving social and political goals; and (c) who is responsible for the shape of memory in the society. These are particularly important questions at a time when historical relativity and revisionism are used as tools in international relations, and when gradual globalization provokes confrontation with memories. This topic is important for Poland as a country which, only beginning in the last decade of the twentieth century, entered onto a path of social dialogue and bilateral relations with Israel. Those relations are still strongly emotional because of the historical and stereotypical burden involved. Understanding each partner’s collective memory and identity and confronting it with our own mental images seems to be the only path of future dialogue. Study of memory and identity building in Israel can also help Poland to deal with its own past and images.

Memory and identity are integral to how modern democracies influence state politics and social life. Of course, we can easily claim and prove the opposite, namely that state politics and social life are integral parts of memory and identity. These notions, regardless their broader or narrower meaning, are always inseparably connected, each of them the necessary condition and function of the other. Their internal relation is so strong that in many cases it is hard to decide which of them is primary and which is secondary. Only in relation to individual political and social facts can we say that memory “comes” later, so is therefore secondary. On more general grounds, however, we notice that political decision making and social life are influenced by memory of past decisions and events. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this article, we need to stress the basic difference between memory and identity versus state politics and social life. Memory and identity are intangible and imagined notions, created and shared by some larger group of population, while state politics and social life are very tangible because they are built on social and political facts. The intangibility of memory and identity does not make those two abstract. On the contrary - they always tend to be inseparable from time, place, factual events and people, who provide specific meanings. By this means we can see in state history two parallel realities, one factual and the other imagined, developed in parallel and influencing one another (Halbwachs 1992, les Goff 1992, Anderson 1997).
One must also distinguish between memory and identity, but also understand the interactions of the two. Memory takes different forms, depending on who is influencing and who is sharing it. It can be personal, private, or family, but can also belong to larger cultural groups, tribes, or whole societies. There is always some anthropological, political, or social context in which memory is created and shared. The private or group preferences allow, and sometimes enforce the changes, omissions and interpretations which serve some current purpose, or are sometimes implemented without visible aim. The memory is altered according to current needs (Thelen, 1989).

In his research, Maurice Halbwachs uses the term “collective memory,” a very useful construct for the purpose of this article. In his opinion, collective memory has nothing in common with historical facts shared by some community; rather, it stands in opposition to history. In order to have a proper historical understanding, one needs to notice the whole complexity, take different perspectives and accept ambiguities. This does not happen with collective memory, which tends to simplify events, takes one biased perspective and does not tolerate ambiguities. Collective memory does not recognize chronology and time; it interpolates events, and is created to justify the foundations of group or social status. According to Halbwachs (1992), collective memory is the reconstruction of the past with the data and facts from the present time; it is based on stories and documents provided by eye witnesses, as processed later by historians. Halbwachs makes a distinction between social memory and historical memory. Social memory is the memory of personally witnessed events, it is a form of group experience which is remembered. Taking the Holocaust into account, social memory is reserved for the generation of survivors only. On the other hand, historical memory is the processed and shared historical creation presented in secondary descriptions, books, films and the educational system. Historical memory refers to and is shared by the majority of Jews in Israel because they were born after the Holocaust.

In this process of combining past and present and looking for some continuity of events, historiography casts elements of national identity. But social and historical memory represent only part of the phenomenon of national identity. National identity is an amalgam of collective memories, symbols, myths and prejudices connected with the past, present and future of a nation. It contains the particular nation characteristics such as: its genealogy, past, tradition, victories and defeats, heroes, and even current potential and future plans. Identity, a deeply emotional notion, can easily generate patriotic or even nationalistic feelings. Identity and its elements are rarely criticized and revised because this could shake the foundations of the social and political system (Anderson 1997, Sztompka 2002).

STATE FOUNDATIONS

Before I focus on Holocaust memory, I would like to briefly discuss other elements of Israeli identity. In relatively new societies based on immigrants, it is hard to extract, especially in the beginning, one dominating cultural pattern which may become a common denominator for all society members. In the case of Israel, however, it is worthwhile to present the factors that were common to many of the immigrants, starting from the time before the founding of the Israeli state. Here we can point to a common religion, common genealogy, memory of the biblical Israel, a new Hebrew language, Zionism, memory of European anti-Semitism, and memory of the Holocaust (Segev 1989). In the course of Israeli history we can observe a gradual replacement of the ancient, genealogical, Zionist and religious factors by the images and memories of more current events. This natural process progresses with the growth of
modern Israeli experience. Heroism, militaristic society, and Middle East conflict are the new identity factors that have emerged. The only exemptions to this process are memories of the Holocaust and European anti-Semitism, which both reside in the state foundations. Their role in collective memory and identity remains vivid, growing continuously by gaining new forms and representations. This is explainable in case of anti-Semitism, which cannot be treated as a strictly historical phenomenon because it is still present in modern societies. We cannot talk about the Holocaust as a present phenomenon, but only as a revived memory. The importance of this memory, as evidenced by Israel's attempt to stress its unique Jewish character, is shown in the change in terminology from "Holocaust" to "Shoa." In recent years many research institutions and museum responsible for the presentation of history and memory, such as Yad Vashem and the United States Holocaust Memorial, have broadened the definition of the Holocaust. Thus, the Holocaust is no longer perceived as only a uniquely Jewish experience. More and more projects are presenting the reality of the Holocaust in modern times. Those projects focus on exposing the common pattern of perpetrators and victims, not only of the Nazi Holocaust, but also of other societies, such as Darfur, Bosnia and Rwanda, where genocide and other crimes against humanity have also occurred.

The majority of prime factors crucial to Israeli identity can be found in the "Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel," later repeated in the basic legal code. In the Declaration of May 14th, 1948, we read:

The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations.

Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland.

In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations.

The above document clearly indicates that the establishment of a state was a consequence of the Holocaust and that the state grew out of the necessity to protect world Jewry and to counteract any future genocide. The Holocaust, provoking strong moral trauma for the whole humanity, stimulated the world leaders to establish the State of Israel (Segev 2002).

The mentioned theories concerning collective memory and identity can be easily applied to the case of Israel’s memory of the Holocaust. This memory in the almost 60 years of the country’s history never remained constant, especially because it was transformed from social memory of the first generation to the historical memory of the sabras born in Israel.
FIRST GENERATION

In the second half of 1945 around 90,000 Jewish refugees arrived in Palestine from Europe. All of them had survived under Nazi or Soviet occupation, and the majority had been in concentration camps. Over the next three years, another 60,000 survivors would follow, and in the first years of new statehood an additional 200,000 European survivors would emigrate to Israel. At the end of 1949 there were around 350,000 Jewish survivors of the Holocaust living in Israel, representing one third of the population (Sikron 1957).

Those survivors were not warmly welcomed in their new state and nation. In the 40’s and 50’s in Israel, on the wave of constructing a new identity, there was no space in public discourse for non heroic elements. Those who, according to general opinion, had been led like “sheep to slaughter,” did not get recognition in the eyes of battle hardened Israelis. Moreover, their histories and memories were treated as a social, collective taboo. In this period the Israelis were unwilling to confront the traumatic memory of the Holocaust; they were reluctant to ask questions and unable to listen. This attitude towards memory is very repetitive when, in the period just after a traumatic event, society attempts to recover through forgetting, often through destruction of material proofs like monuments, prisons, and also by rejecting the witness or survivors. This was especially true in the freshly created Israel, going through its own internal and external problems and wars and trying to forge a new strong identity, built out of immigrants. Some role in this rejection process was also played by the sense of responsibility and overwhelming feeling of helplessness when the Holocaust was happening in Europe and information about it was reaching Palestine (Dobkin 1946).

The survivors on the other hand had to face the psychological problem of starting a new life, one of the elements being a feeling of guilt for being a survivor in the first place. If any interest was shown in their stories it was always aimed at justifying their survival. An additional burden was the lack of language to describe the cruelties of war and genocide, a lack not only of a means of expression, but also a lack of commonly shared language in Israel at that time. This situation left the survivors trapped in their own memories, which could only be shared, at best, with the closest members of their families. Parents sometimes forced their children to acknowledge the burden of memory by giving them the names of family members murdered in Europe (Elon 1983). New immigrants often broke ties with those family members who decided to stay in Europe after the Holocaust.

New Israeli collective memory and identity was based on faith in the possibilities of a new man, created and shaped by Zionist ideology. The memory of Holocaust survivors was in some way dehumanized by referring to this generation as to “sheep led to slaughter” or “human dust.” In that period it was necessary for society to forget about the old world order and roots remaining in Europe. Everybody was to be focused on the construction of a new heroic and strong society, which will never again allow to be oppressed.

Some of the survivors were able to find relief by fierce belief in and construction of the new Israeli Zionist identity, at the same time freezing its traumatic experiences for the indefinite future. They were trying to deal with the nightmares on their own, depriving their children of answers to questions which were often formulated among the young generation, but rarely asked. It was also common that the survivors were falsifying their past in order to be perceived as heroic fighters born already in Israel (Dasberg 2000).
The majority of survivors were sent to kibbutzes, where they had to take Hebrew names and learn to operate within the frames of a totally new Zionist identity. Those first years only exacerbated the Holocaust trauma in the minds of individual survivors, deprived of professional help and left alone to deal with this chapter of their lives. In the official political discourse, the survivors were referred to as people who need to be “re-educated”; they had to learn to love their new country and integrate the moral values of Israeli society. Memory of the Holocaust was socially frozen (Segev 2000).

At the same time, political and social life in Israel began to face the problem of the Holocaust and its definition. There were three major events in the 1950’s and the beginning of the 1960’s which directly or indirectly had to address the Holocaust in its social and political dimensions, at the same time that Israelis were addressing the shape of memory and identity. These were creation of the “Law of Return,” creation of "Yad Vashem," and establishment of relations with Germany and negotiation of war reparations.

Creation of the Law of Return was the first, basic legal act in the new country. From the very beginning, the founders of Israel wanted to make the new country safe and always accessible to all Jews in the world in need of shelter. This was a lesson learned from memory of past persecutions and particularly from the Holocaust. Most Israelis remembered the British immigration quota, which had blocked the access of European Jews to Palestine.

The second milestone in the Israeli approach to the Holocaust in the 1950’s was the legal establishment of Yad Vashem. Initial attempts to commemorate the Holocaust had already been taken in 1942, while a majority of the victims were still alive. The name "Yad Vashem" was suggested at that time for a place that would commemorate the war victims and heroes of Israel. In the social discourse during the war, politicians in Israel referred to the Holocaust as some distant event from the past, quite often linking commemoration with the need for reparations (Dobkin 1946). The mass emigration from Europe and later Independence War in Israel put the commemoration plans on hold. The Yad Vashem plan was revitalized by Mordechai Shenhabi in 1950. At that time he could officially request the institutions of a new country to continue the registration of Holocaust victims and to grant posthumous Israeli citizenship to all victims. The lawyers who were to give opinions on honorary citizenship for victims could not reach agreement, so the government established The Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority, leaving the citizenship problem for later consideration.

In 1951 the Knesset designated 27 Nissan as "Yom-ha Shoa" a day of Holocaust Remembrance in Israel. On the May 18, 1953, the Knesset voted unanimously in favor of the "Yad Vashem Establishment Bill," which established the "Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority." This theme of juxtaposing destruction with the heroism of the resistance fighters had been present in Israel from the very beginning, and became an integral part of memory and identity building. At that time it was the only possible way to access the painful Holocaust history from the position of heroic Zionism. In the first years of its existence, Yad Vashem limited itself to collecting data about the victims. The first exhibition opened in 1958 in the administration building. During this period of time, due to the prevailing social climate, Yad Vashem had a very limited impact on collective memory and identity. However, this would change very soon.

The third 1950's event crucial for revitalization of Holocaust memory was the establishment of bilateral economic relations with Germany, including violent debate about the reparations for Israel. David Ben Gurion, ever the pragmatic politician, would have made a variety of concessions, if only they could have led to development of the Israeli state. The Israeli
boycott of Germany had to be eased when trade possibilities favorable for Israel appeared and the vision of reparations and compensations became very attractive. In the emotional political battles of that time we can see the conflict between religion, culture and memory of the Holocaust on one side and the new elements of Israeli identity focusing on state development and the needs of future generations, on the other. At this point of its development, Israel was much more directed towards the future, which is why Zionist negotiations with Germany were successful, leading to establishment of bilateral relations and payment of reparations. On this occasion different political parties in Israel noticed the potential in memory of the Holocaust. Menahem Begin and his Herut party pictured themselves as defenders of the national dignity and Holocaust memory by standing in strong opposition to Ben-Gurion and his negotiations. But society was not ready to defend memory yet, because it was still shared only by the survivors, and therefore had limited social impact.

**THE EICHMANN TRIAL**

The beginning of the 1960’s saw the Eichmann trial, and with it a fundamental change in the approach to memory of the Holocaust could be observed. In the late 1950’s, the Mossad received information on where Eichmann was hiding. In May 1959 he was kidnapped in Buenos Aires and transported to Israel. His trial in Jerusalem did not start until April 1961. The interim between his capture and trial witnessed an intense debate among Israelis about how to deal with memory of the Holocaust, a debate that would prove decisive for the future shape of historical memory. It was the first time that Israeli society had a chance to acknowledge the survivors’ history, to live through them and internalize their experience, thereby creating a common historical memory of the Holocaust. The trial was broadcast on national TV and widely covered in the newspapers.

Eichmann was tried on the basis of the Israeli "Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law," which was introduced by the Knesset in 1950. This Law precisely categorized Nazi crimes and provided punishments under Israeli law. From the memory perspective it is interesting that crimes committed on European territory against Jews, who had been citizens of many different countries, were in this case understood as crimes committed on Israeli territory and judged in the light of Israeli law. (A similar situation had occurred a few years earlier, when Israel claimed to be the sole representative of Holocaust victims in negotiating German reparations.) The idea of judging perpetrators in light of Israeli Law was socially understood as a posthumous moral victory.

From a logistical point of view, it would have been much easier to kill Eichmann in Argentina, but in this case it was not Eichmann that was important, it was the trial itself, taking place in Jerusalem, conducted by the society that was gradually becoming a society of survivors. The trial was used as a kind of group therapy for the whole nation. Dating from this event we can observe a gradual transition of Holocaust memory from painful and hard to encompass trauma into institutionalized, nationally shared historical memory. Until that moment, images of the Holocaust were haunting many of the survivors, imprisoning them in years of silence. The Eichmann trial forced them to confront their traumatic memories and pass them on, often for the first time, to their children and then to succeeding generations.

Political interest was also apparent. Throughout the Eichmann trial, Ben-Gurion sought to project a positive image for his Mapai party, sidestepping allegations of passivity during the Holocaust, and directing attention away from the recent Kastner trial, thereby guaranteeing
future control of the Holocaust legacy and its memory for his Mapai party. The leading Mapai party also had a few social aims to be achieved through the Eichmann trial. The first was to integrate the Holocaust experience into the next generations of Israelis, who were brought up in the atmosphere of silence about Shoa. Of course this education had to be carefully prepared; facts had to be chosen and presented for the needs of Israeli society in a way that would not threaten or destroy the image of heroism promoted from the beginning of the state's creation. Memory of the Holocaust had to be reconciled with Zionist ideology, still strong in the society, in order to archive the desired effect of national unification around the commonly shared memory of the Holocaust. In the beginning of the 1960’s, the ethos of Jewish pioneers developing the land of their forefathers was fading away. First, tensions between Moroccan Jews and the Ashkenazi establishment were endangering the status quo. Ben-Gurion decided to include these "oriental" Jews in the process of Holocaust education, so that every member of society could treat this event as a reference point and social integration factor. There was a need to find an idea that could unite the society again – an idea that would be purifying and patriotic and that would lead to national catharsis.

But the Eichmann trail also had its international connotations and aims in the minds of the Mapai leaders. Their first objective was to make world leaders interested in Holocaust history again, at the same time stressing that it is an Israeli historical experience. The second objective was to show the connection between past endangerment of the Jews in Europe and the present endangerment of Israel by surrounding, hostile Arab states. This process equated anti-Semitism with anti–Zionism. The Eichmann trial established a new memory pattern for future generations of Israelis, in which Holocaust memory was gradually integrated with Zionist heroism.

THE SECOND GENERATION

After the Eichmann trial, Israeli society was never again the same in its approach to Holocaust memory. The succeeding years, which saw an escalation of the Middle East conflict and increasing militarization, would also be affected by memory of the Holocaust. The former juxtaposition of Holocaust with heroism had to be replaced by reconciliation of these two Jewish and Israeli experiences. Unfortunately, this often led to use of Holocaust memory for political aims.

Holocaust survivors fought in all the Israeli wars. The first immigrants had to fight in the Independence War, yet this did not integrate them into the new society. Even after the war was won, the division of the Israeli army into heroic Sabras and passive European Jews was preserved (Yablonka 2000). The second war was fought in 1956. At that moment, the first attempts were made to link the current fear of destruction of Israel with the fear known from the period of the Holocaust. It was still too early, however, because social awareness of the Holocaust was relatively low. On the other hand, in this war Israeli society had to face a problem of becoming occupier and even take responsibility for massacres in Kfar Kassem and Dajr Jasin. During this period, the cooperation of the survivors with the sabras was based on four basic foundations: The Holocaust was a major factor in the establishment of Israel; the world was hostile and did nothing to save the Jews; there is a linkage between the Holocaust and heroism; and the less talk about Holocaust the better (Smith 2001).

The war of 1967 was fought in the context of new Holocaust memory realities, memory which had been gradually internalized and become a part of identity. Just before the war,
when Nasser was spreading propaganda about American ships evacuating Jews from Israel and promising a total destruction of the country, the mental connection to the Holocaust was inescapable. The Religious Council of Tel Aviv surveyed the city’s parks, sport fields and empty plots and sanctified them as cemeteries (Segev 2000). One of the young soldiers in a later interview for *The Seventh Day* said:

“People believed we would be exterminated if we lost the war. We got this idea—or inherited it—from the concentration camps. It’s a concrete idea for anyone who has grown up in Israel, even if he personally didn’t experience Hitler’s persecution. Genocide— it is a real possibility. There are the means to do it. That’s the lesson of the gas chambers. The fact of Jewish existence in Israel isn’t yet unquestionable.” (Deutsch 1971, p. 160).

The politics of Nasser were continually compared to those of Hitler, but at the same time heroic acts in Jewish and Israeli history were also recalled. The fear of destruction led the Israeli Defense Forces to attack all three neighboring countries on June 5, 1967. The war was soon finished, with a spectacular victory and seizure of new territories: Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Society was gradually becoming aware of the enormous victory and the meaning of Israel returning to the Old City in Jerusalem and to the Western Wall. The spirit of fight and the final victory were attributed to the Holocaust memory as well. Uri Ramon, a young officer, said in this regard:

”Two days before, when we felt that we were at the decisive moment and I was in uniform, armed and grimy for a night patrol, I came to the Ghetto Fighters Museum at Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot. I wanted to pay my respects to the memory of the fighters, only some of whom had reached this day when the nation was rising up to defend itself. I felt clearly that our war began there, in the crematoriums, in the camps, in the ghettos and in the forests. I have left this museum pure and clear and strong for this war.”(Ramon 1969, p. 57).

The social feeling was that finally the time had come when others were now suffering loss, the problem of constant fear and endangerment solved once and forever. The Israelis proved to themselves and others that they were no longer “sheep led to slaughter.” Now, they had a country and nation able to face any enemy. That was also the moment when Israeli militarism was mythologized, because the society felt itself closer to the heroic defenders of the Warsaw Ghetto than to the victims of the death camps. With this victory a new question arose: whether the Israeli army, cherishing the legacy of the Holocaust, could now serve as an occupation force in the new territories.

The euphoria didn't last long, because the Yom Kippur War of 1973 once again brought the phantom of the Holocaust before everyone's eyes. This time the element of surprise was used by the Arab armies. In the Sinai Campaign in 1956, the fear of destruction came just before victory and led to the Israeli Army withdrawal. During the Six-Day War, fear was present before the war and provided the stimulus that led to victory. In 1973 fear came in the middle of the campaign, and it shook the very foundations of the country. The war was finally won, but at the price of 2,500 victims, representing one victim per thousand Israeli citizens. The war was a serious blow to the sense of security gained in 1967. Once again, everyone realized that destruction is possible. The Israeli ideas of self-sufficiency and heroism promoted in the education system faded away in the Yom Kippur War. Israel needed financial support not only from the Diaspora, but also from the international community.
After 1973, Menachem Begin was elected prime minister. From the very beginning of his political career, he was promoted as a fighter for Holocaust memory and its representation in society. Indeed, he often presented himself as a survivor of the Holocaust. This was important, because for this group the Holocaust was not a personal experience, so they often accused the Ashkenazi establishment of misusing the Holocaust and its memory for political purposes.

The next military conflict, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, once again inspired political and social comparisons to the Holocaust. Before the invasion, Begin addressed the members of his cabinet:

“You know what I have done and what we have all done to prevent war and loss of life. But such is our fate in Israel. There is no way other then to fight selflessly. Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka, and we have decided that there will be no more Treblinkas” (Noar 1986, p. 47).

When Israel was criticized in international circles, especially for massacres which were carried out with the knowledge of Israeli Defense Forces in two Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila, Begin kept repeating that after the Holocaust nobody in the world had the right to teach moral lessons to Israel.

Such misuse of Holocaust memory by the government evoked almost immediate social discussion, led mainly by the left-wing supporters. In the beginning of the 1980’s, the journalist Boaz Evron wrote an article, “The Holocaust: A Danger to the Nation,” in which he predicted a turning point in the way that Holocaust memory would be shaped. First, he attacked the view of the Holocaust as a uniquely Jewish experience by presenting the Nazi plan to exterminate the Gypsies, the mentally and physically handicapped, and other groups. He accused the Zionist leaders and their ideology of using memory of a Jewish-only Holocaust in order to promote the moral superiority of Israel while at the same time creating an isolated society (Segev 2000). He also condemned the constant comparison of Arab countries with the Third Reich. Such an approach by its leaders was portrayed as a real threat to Israel and its people. From this moment onward we can observe researchers and politicians presenting more general and global conclusions drawn from the Holocaust experience. Memory of the Holocaust gradually became not just an Israeli domain, but a more global phenomenon (Weiss 2000).

War and conflict in different forms, from World War II to the occupation of Lebanon and the Intifada, would become integral elements of Israeli identity. Each generation of Israelis identified itself with the particular war or wars that had the greatest impact on them, as a result of personal participation in war, loss of family members, or memory of splendid victory. The gradual internalization of Holocaust memory led to the point that World War II and the Holocaust became common experiences, shared by all of Israeli society.

**MEMORY TODAY: REFLECTIONS**

Andreas Huyssen writes (1986), “Remembrance as a vital human activity shapes our links to the past, and the ways we remember define us in the present. As individuals and societies, we need the past to construct and to anchor our identities and to nurture a vision of the future”
This is very visible in the Israeli approach to Holocaust memory. Nowadays the key role in the process of shaping and preserving this memory is played by specialized museum institutions and monuments, created and erected to research history, educate and promote memory. This role grows when members of society commemorate events of the past, creating objective, collective memory, to be shared by everyone.

Those institutions play a crucial role in inter-generational memory transmission. To understand this process it is crucial to make a distinction between primary and secondary witnesses of the Holocaust. Primary narratives are based on experienced facts and are remembered as social memory. Secondary narratives are versions of the primary ones, reproduced in the process of research, generalization, drawing conclusions and commentaries. All this is a part of the historical memory of society. Hirsch defines historical memory and its images as “postmemory”:

“Postmemory is distinguished from memory by generational distance and from history by deep personal connection. Postmemory is a powerful and very particular form of memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but through imaginative investment and creation” (Hirsch 1997, p. 22).

The task of forging and preserving postmemory of the Holocaust in Israel was given mainly to Yad Vashem, but also to other commemoration institutions like kibbutzes, Yad Mordecai, Lohamei Hagetaot, and numerous museums and monuments all over the country. All those institutions with their political affiliations have always tried to influence social identity in the country. Very direct political influence is visible during numerous commemoration days.

In order to observe how present Israeli identity is shaped, we should have a closer look at the different commemoration days and state festivals introduced and shaped by politicians in Israel. In 1951 the Knesset passed a bill about The commemoration day of “The Holocaust and the Ghetto Uprising” (hebr. Jom Ha-Shoa we Ha-gwura). Only in 1959 was a second bill passed, mandating how this day should be observed. The name was changed to “The Commemoration Day of the Holocaust and Heroism”. This included one day of national mourning, with official political ceremonies at Yad Vashem and sirens at noon. The next bill, including the needs of the leftist lobby for Uprising Commemoration and religious lobby for more religious character of the day, was passed in 1961, and remains in force. The day is now named “The Commemoration Day of Holocaust Uprising and Heroism,” and starts according to the religious calendar on the evening proceeding the 27th day of Nissan.

By following the name changes we can observe the political importance of this day. In the final version from 1961, the single word "Holocaust" was replaced by two words: "Uprising" and "Heroism." A week after this day, there comes another commemoration day: the Jom Ha-Zikaron in memory of the Jewish soldiers who fell during all of Israel’s wars. The sirens sound once again, and the week between Yom Ha-Shoa and Yom Ha-Zikaron is designated a period of mourning and remembrance of Holocaust and heroism.

After this time of mourning there comes catharsis represented by two joyful state festivals which are: Yom Ha-Acmaut (Independence Day) celebrated, on the 4th day of Iyar, just one day after Yom-Ha Zikaron, and on the 28th day of Iyar is the celebration of Jom Jerushalaim (Day of Jerusalem). Independence Day is the anniversary of British withdrawal from Palestine and proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. Today it is celebrated as a joyful...
festival with still visible elements of Zionist ideas. The Day of Jerusalem commemorates re-
unification of Jerusalem under Israeli administration after the Six-Day War of 1967.

There is no doubt that the process of shaping social memory in Israel and of forging a
common Israeli identity has been an important internal policy task of successive governments.
The current aims in the country’s social and internal policy can be achieved by skillful and
conscious collective memory building and bringing to public attention only chosen historical
events. This defines and realizes the aims of social integrity, feelings of independence, and
historical awareness and constant morale building, crucial for a country in a continuous state

In recent decades there has been a noticeable weakening of Zionist ideology in Israel in the
wake of gradual globalization and Americanization of Israeli society. At the same time the
rise of individual and collective Holocaust consciousness and remembrance is becoming more
central to Israeli identity.

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Israel's Jewish population is united in the belief that Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people. Beyond that, though, there are deep divisions among secular Jews, the ultra-Orthodox, and the religious Zionists, and the conflict shapes political arguments over Israel's future as a democracy. Tensions between ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews are shaping Israeli politics. Here's everything you need to know: Why is there tension? Israel's Jewish population is united in the belief that Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people. Beyond that, though, there are deep divisions among secular Jews, the ultra-Orthodox, and the religious Zionists, and the conflict shapes political arguments over Israel's future as a democracy.

Jews living under the Tsar produced endless Yiddish plays and satires containing barely concealed allusions to the Tsar as the latest incarnation of Pharaoh. Exodus is a foundation upon which Jewish identity, as well as Jewish religiosity, is built, and for this reason it has greatly preoccupied even the most atheistic of Jews, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud among them. Moses, as a subconscious archetype, squats in the shadows of the Jewish psyche. Paul Johnson's philo-Semitic A History of the Jews is a good example in this respect, though his treatment of ancient Jewish history is full of contradictions. For example, Johnson acknowledges that proto-Jewish populations were highly problematic for Egyptian authorities. The central European Jewish composers imprisoned there, men such as Viktor Ullmann, Pavel Haas, and Gideon Klein, have received enormous attention in the past two decades. Even the historic performance of Giuseppe Verdi's Requiem at Terezín has been held up as a symbol of â€œspiritual resistanceâ€ and a stand-in for European Jewry's entire Holocaust experience. These acts of cultural recovery satisfy a contemporary public desire for historical meaning. Lost in this schematic narrative is the more complicated story of how vast numbers of Jewish composers in Poland and the Soviet Union encountered and interpreted the Holocaust in real time. Mention of Shostakovich points to a second key obstacle to recapturing the Holocaust in Soviet sound. A chorus of Jewish politicians and scholars warn against Israeli realpolitik clouding historically accurate depictions of World War II war crimes. Israel and Netanyahu have knowingly abandoned their role as the defenders of the memory of the Holocaust. Israel's failure to protest the passage of a 2015 bill honoring Ukrainian nationalists who murdered Jews was disappointing, said Eduard Dolinsky, the Kiev-based director of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, an advocacy group. While it was a â€œbig dealâ€ when Israeli President Reuven Rivlin spoke out against honoring collaborators during a speech a year and a half later, Dolinsky believed that more should have been done.