The Jekyll and Hyde of Emotional Intelligence:

Emotion Regulation Knowledge Facilitates Prosocial and Interpersonally Deviant Behavior

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Abstract

Does emotional intelligence strictly promote behavior that benefits the greater good, or can it also advance interpersonal deviance? In this investigation, we test the possibility that a core facet of emotional intelligence – emotion regulation knowledge – can promote both prosocial and interpersonally deviant behavior. Drawing from research on how the effective regulation of emotion promotes goal achievement, we propose that emotion regulation knowledge strengthens the effects of other-oriented and self-oriented personality traits on prosocial behavior and interpersonal deviance, respectively. Two studies supported our predictions. Among individuals with high (rather than low) emotion regulation knowledge, moral identity exhibited a stronger positive association with prosocial behavior in a social dilemma (Study 1) and Machiavellianism exhibited a stronger positive association with interpersonal deviance in the workplace (Study 2). Thus, emotion regulation knowledge has a positive side and a darker side – it may benefit brilliant emotional saints and evil emotional geniuses alike. (147 words)

Keywords: emotional intelligence, emotion regulation knowledge, prosocial behavior, interpersonal deviance
The Jekyll and Hyde of Emotional Intelligence: Emotion Regulation Knowledge Facilitates Prosocial and Interpersonally Deviant Behavior

Emotional intelligence (EI) has been overwhelmingly associated with prosociality in the popular press and the academic literature. For instance, in a best-selling book, Goleman (1995) proclaimed that “there is an old-fashioned word for the body of skills that emotional intelligence represents: character … the psychological muscle that moral conduct requires” (p. 285). In this vein, scholars have explored links between EI and prosocial behavior, defined as actions that benefit others and enhance their welfare (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). Individuals scoring high on composite measures of EI criticized others less (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006) and acted less aggressively (Brackett & Mayer, 2003), relative to those with lower scores. In other relevant studies, individuals skilled at recognizing and labeling emotions were more cooperative (Izard et al., 2001), and individuals skilled at regulating emotion helped others more (Lopes, Salovey, Côté, & Beers, 2005), relative to their lower ability counterparts.

Yet, this literature may provide an unbalanced view of the role of EI in social life. EI reflects how well individuals process emotions and emotional information (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). As such, EI may facilitate a wide range of social behaviors, and not only socially-valued behavior (Austin, Farrelly, Black, & Moore, 2007; Hawley, 1997; Kilduff, Chiaburu, & Menges, 2010). In the foundational article introducing the concept of EI, Salovey and Mayer (1990) noted that “those whose [emotional] skills are channeled antisocially may create manipulative scenes or lead others sociopathically to nefarious ends” (p. 198). In support of this alternative view, in one study, school bullies obtained higher scores on a test of emotion understanding, relative to non-bullies (Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999).
In this article, we strive to reconcile these different views about how EI relates to (anti)social behavior. We propose that a core facet of EI – emotion regulation knowledge – can further both good and evil by strengthening associations between personality traits and both prosocial behavior and interpersonal deviance, defined as actions that benefit the self by contravening norms and harming others’ interests (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Emotion regulation knowledge involves awareness of the most effective strategies to modify and nurture emotions in particular situations. It is part of the emotion regulation branch within Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) model of EI. There is considerable evidence for the validity of this facet of EI (see Joseph & Newman, 2010, for meta-analytic evidence, and Mayer et al., 2008, for a review). Drawing from research on the role of effectively regulating emotions in goal achievement (Erber & Erber, 2000; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008), we propose that emotion regulation knowledge can bring out both prosocial and interpersonally deviant behavior, depending on individuals’ personality traits.

**How Emotion Regulation Knowledge Facilitates Prosocial Behavior and Interpersonal Deviance**

Personality traits are “dimensions of individual differences in tendencies to show consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions” (McCrae & Costa, 1990, p. 23). Traits shape how individuals direct their attention and activate specific goals (McCrae & Costa, 1995). Certain traits direct attention outwardly towards others, leading individuals to pay attention to others’ needs and recognize opportunities to help others (De Dreu, 2006; Grant & Mayer, 2009). Individuals high on these traits are motivated to subordinate their own interests and benefit others (Grant & Mayer, 2009). In this investigation, we examine one such trait, moral identity. In comparison, other traits lead individuals to focus their attention inwardly on themselves, leading
them to place less inherent worth in others’ well-being and reduce their commitment to benefit others (De Dreu, 2006). Individuals high on these traits are motivated to prioritize their own outcomes. In this research, we examine one such trait, Machiavellianism.

Although personality traits motivate related goals, individuals do not always successfully achieve these goals. For instance, people who are motivated to act prosocially often ultimately prioritize their own interests (Epley & Dunning, 2000). One reason why trait-motivated goals may not always be achieved is that individuals vary on how well they can regulate emotions that facilitate or hinder goal attainment. Some emotions facilitate goal accomplishment by focusing individuals’ attention on the goal-relevant features of situations (Frijda, 1986). Other emotions impede goal accomplishment because they are distracting and draining, or because they trigger actions that are unrelated to or incompatible with goals (Metcalf & Mischel, 1999). This implies that individuals must know how to effectively regulate their emotions in order to achieve trait-motivated goals.

There is evidence that individuals exert efforts to amplify and maintain emotions that help them achieve their goals (Erber & Erber, 2000). In one study, individuals who anticipated playing a confrontational video game that involved killing enemies deliberately chose to up-regulate their anger, which, in turn, enhanced their performance in the game (Tamir et al., 2008). Emotion regulation knowledge should help individuals to identify the most effective strategies to generate and nurture goal-conducive emotions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). In a situation involving a social dilemma, when individuals must decide whether to benefit the common good or the self, compassion may facilitate prosociality and pride may stand in the way of cooperation (Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010). In these situations, other-oriented individuals may try to generate and nurture compassion, and these efforts should be most successful among individuals with high
emotion regulation knowledge. Self-oriented individuals, in contrast, may focus on generating and nurturing pride, and these efforts should succeed to the extent that individuals are aware of the best strategies to do so. Thus, emotion regulation knowledge may help individuals regulate goal-conducive emotions, so as to channel the motivation provided by traits into greater levels of trait-consistent behavior.

These arguments informed the central hypothesis guiding the two studies presented here: Emotion regulation knowledge moderates associations between personality traits and (anti)social behavior, such that individuals with higher emotion regulation knowledge show stronger associations between their traits and both prosocial behavior (Study 1) and interpersonal deviance (Study 2), relative to those with less emotion regulation knowledge.

**Study 1: The Dr. Jekyll of Emotion Regulation Knowledge: Moral Identity and Prosocial Behavior in a Social Dilemma**

In Study 1, we examined whether emotion regulation knowledge strengthens the association between the trait of moral identity, defined as how central being a moral person is to a person’s self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and prosocial behavior. Individuals with high moral identity should be motivated to act prosocially to ensure that their actions match how they view themselves. We predicted that there would be a positive association between moral identity and prosocial behavior in a social dilemma, and that this association would be stronger among individuals with high emotion regulation knowledge, relative to those with less knowledge.

**Method**

**Participants.** Participants were 131 students enrolled in the undergraduate commerce program at the University of Toronto (59% female; ages: $M = 20.23$, $SD = 1.44$; range = 18 to 26).
**Procedure.** We recruited participants in three sections of an introductory course in organizational behavior. Students were asked to indicate on a consent form (approved by the University’s Office of Research Ethics) whether they agreed to let the researchers use data from class exercises for this study. All students agreed.

There were two phases of data collection. In the first phase, participants completed an online survey that included the measure of emotion regulation knowledge and demographic questions. They were instructed to complete this survey during the first two weeks of the course. The second phase took place one month later. Participants completed another online survey that included the measure of moral identity and a social dilemma situation. After completing this second survey, students attended a lecture about research related to this study.

**Measures.**

*Emotion regulation knowledge (Phase 1).* Participants completed the 30-item Situational Test of Emotion Management (STEM; MacCann & Roberts, 2008). The STEM assesses the degree to which respondents are aware of the most effective strategies to regulate emotional situations. Each item describes an emotional situation and presents four potential courses of action to amplify, maintain, or suppress an emotion in this situation. Respondents select the course of action that is most effective, and they receive credit to the extent that their choices match those of experts (psychologists, life coaches, and counselors). A sample item is: “Lee’s workmate fails to deliver an important piece of information on time, causing Lee to fall behind schedule also. What action would be the most effective for Lee? (a) Work harder to compensate, (b) Get angry with the workmate, (c) Explain the urgency of the situation to the workmate, and (d) Never rely on that workmate again.” (Option c is the best answer.)
The STEM is not strongly correlated with cognitive abilities and personality traits, supporting its discriminant validity (MacCann, 2010). Criterion validity is supported by correlations with life satisfaction and grades (MacCann & Roberts, 2008). In past research, the test exhibited acceptable internal reliability (MacCann & Roberts, 2008).

**Moral identity (Phase 2).** We administered Aquino and Reed’s (2002) well-validated ten-item measure of moral identity. Respondents read a list of characteristics (e.g., caring, compassionate) and then indicated their agreement with ten statements about these characteristics on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). A sample statement is “I strongly desire to have these characteristics.”

**Prosocial behavior (Phase 2).** We adapted a social dilemma situation from past research (Brewer & Kramer, 1986). Participants read a statement explaining that many resources such as water exist in a fixed amount, and that their existence depends on people’s reasonable consumption. The statement indicated that the less each person consumes, the more there is for everyone, and that it is possible to consume so much that there is none for everyone. Participants were asked to decide how many points between 0 and 10 they wanted to take for themselves from a common pool of 500 points. They read that one participant would receive a $100 gift certificate from a (real) lottery, and that the more points they took, the higher were their chances of winning the lottery. However, if there were no more points in the common pool, there would be no lottery, and nobody would receive the gift certificate. Thus, participants had to decide between increasing their own chances of winning money versus maximizing the common good by increasing the chances that the lottery occurred. The lottery occurred at the end of the course.

Participants could act prosocially by taking a small number of points to increase the chances that the lottery occurred and benefited one of the participants. The measure of prosocial
behavior thus consisted of the number of points participants left in the common resource pool, between 0 and 10. Participants left an average of 3.73 points ($SD = 2.24$; range: 0 to 9 points).

**Control variables (Phase 1).** In some past research, women (Lopes et al., 2005) and older individuals (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) exhibited more emotion regulation knowledge. Thus, there could be interactions that look essentially the same as the hypothesized interaction between moral identity and emotion regulation knowledge, so that the positive association between moral identity and prosocial behavior is stronger among women (relative to men) and older individuals (relative to younger individuals). We verified that this was not the case by controlling for gender, age, and their interactions with moral identity (Hull, Tedlie, & Lehn, 1992).

**Results and Discussion**

Descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliabilities are displayed in Table 1. As expected, there was a positive correlation between moral identity and prosocial behavior. Emotion regulation knowledge was not significantly correlated with prosocial behavior.

We used the hierarchical multiple regression procedures described by Aiken and West (1991) to test our hypothesis that emotion regulation knowledge accentuates the positive association between moral identity and prosocial behavior. We centered all continuous predictors to reduce potential problems of multicollinearity among the variables. We conducted the hierarchical regression analysis in three steps. In the first step, $\Delta R^2 = .04$, $p = .07$, we regressed prosocial behavior on gender (coded as 1 = female and 0 = male), $\beta = .20$, $p < .05$, and age, $\beta = .02$, $p = .81$. In the second step, $\Delta R^2 = .02$, $p = .58$, we added the predictor variable, moral identity, $\beta = .11$, $p = .40$, the moderator variable, emotion regulation knowledge, $\beta = .02$, $p = .81$, the interaction term between moral identity and gender, $\beta = .04$, $p = .73$, and the interaction term
between moral identity and age, $\beta = .03$, $p = .70$. In the final step, $\Delta R^2 = .04$, $p < .05$, we added the interaction term between moral identity and emotion regulation knowledge, which was significant, $\beta = .24$, $p < .05$.

We followed the approach recommended by Aiken and West (1991) to interpret the interaction. A graph of the interaction (see Figure 1) reveals that as expected, the positive association between moral identity and prosocial behavior became more pronounced as emotion regulation knowledge increased. We tested simple slopes for the association between moral identity and prosocial behavior. As expected, the simple slope for this association at one standard deviation in emotion regulation knowledge above the mean was positive and significant, $\beta = .36$, $p < .01$. An increase of one unit in the moral identity of individuals with high emotion regulation knowledge was associated with leaving .92 more points in the pool. The simple slope for this association at one standard deviation in emotion regulation knowledge below the mean was not significant, $\beta = .08$, $p = .43$.

In Study 1, we found that emotion regulation knowledge acted as a moderating variable that strengthened the association between moral identity and prosocial behavior, operationalized as the degree to which individuals refrained from depleting a common pool of resources. We extended these findings in Study 2 by examining whether emotion regulation knowledge strengthens the positive association between Machiavellianism and interpersonal deviance.

**Study 2: The Mr. Hyde of Emotion Regulation Knowledge:**

**Machiavellianism and Interpersonal Deviance in the Workplace**

The trait of Machiavellianism reflects mistrust in human nature and a desire to manipulate others for personal gain, often at the expense of others (Christie & Geis, 1970). Machiavellians are particularly motivated to assert their power over others and feel superior to
others; they are intransigent during bargaining, give orders, and adopt leadership roles in groups (Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996). Denigrating others helps Machiavellians accomplish these goals. Consistent with these arguments, Machiavellianism was positively correlated with interpersonal deviance in past research (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Our conceptual analysis suggests that emotion regulation knowledge should help Machiavellians generate and nurture emotions to meet a goal of asserting dominance. We thus predicted that the positive relation between Machiavellianism and interpersonal deviance would be stronger when emotion regulation knowledge is high rather than low.

Method

Participants. Participants were 252 employees of the University of Toronto (73% female; ages: $M = 39.29$, $SD = 10.16$; range = 22 to 64). They had an average of 16 full years of work experience ($SD = 10$) and held a variety of occupations (e.g., finance officer, manager, accountant). Sixty-two percent had a university undergraduate degree, 20% had less than a university degree, and 16% had a Masters degree or a more advanced degree (2% missing).

Procedure. We recruited participants via an email message sent to managerial, administrative, and professional staff of the University. This message invited full-time employees who had been working in their job for at least three months to participate in a study of the workplace.

There were two phases of data collection. In the first phase, participants completed a consent form (approved by the University’s Office of Research Ethics), measures of emotional and cognitive abilities, and demographic information in a laboratory room. In the second phase, one week later, participants completed a measure of interpersonal deviance online.

Measures.
**Emotion regulation knowledge (Phase 1).** We administered the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002), and we used the 29 items assessing emotion regulation knowledge. Like the STEM, this section of the MSCEIT assesses respondents’ awareness of how to best regulate emotions in specific situations. The items ask respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of various strategies to generate, maintain, or suppress emotions in the situations depicted. Participants receive credit to the extent that their ratings of the effectiveness of each strategy match the ratings provided by expert emotion researchers. ¹

Past studies have established discriminant validity with personality traits and cognitive ability (Côté & Miners, 2006) and criterion validity with the quality of social relationships (Lopes et al., 2005). The test also exhibited adequate test-retest reliability and internal reliability (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Lopes et al., 2005).

**Machiavellianism (Phase 1).** We administered the MACH-IV scale (Christie & Geis, 1970), which asks respondents to indicate their agreement with twenty items on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (see Wilson et al., 1996, for a review of research demonstrating the validity of this instrument). A sample item is “Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.”

**Interpersonal deviance (Phase 2).** We administered Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) scale. Respondents indicated how often they engaged in seven behaviors on a scale of 1 (never) to 7 (daily). A sample item is “I publicly embarrassed someone at work.” Although the content is sensitive, we are confident that participants responded honestly because a) in past research, people were surprisingly willing to report engaging in interpersonal deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000); b) self-reports are correlated with supervisor reports of these behaviors ($r = .48$; Mount, Ilies, & Johnson, 2006); c) meta-analytic research on interpersonal deviance has
found the same results when self-reports were included versus excluded (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007); and d) we emphasized that the survey was confidential and solely for research purposes, which tends to increase the accuracy of self-ratings of behavior (Fletcher & Baldry, 1999). Further, any error due to the self-report nature of this instrument would have made it more difficult to discern effects due to under-reporting and restriction of range, rendering our tests more conservative.

**Control variables (Phase 1).** As in Study 1, we controlled for gender, age, and their respective interactions with Machiavellianism. We also controlled for cognitive ability and its interaction with Machiavellianism because cognitive ability exhibited moderate correlations with emotion regulation knowledge in some past research (MacCann & Roberts, 2008). Thus, there could be an interaction that looks essentially the same as the hypothesized interaction between Machiavellianism and emotion regulation knowledge, so that the positive association between Machiavellianism and interpersonal deviance becomes more pronounced as cognitive ability increases. We measured cognitive ability with the Wonderlic Personnel Test, a widely-used and well-validated 12-minute, 50-question paper-and-pencil test (Wonderlic, 1992).

**Results and Discussion**

Descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliabilities are displayed in Table 2. Machiavellianism was positively correlated with interpersonal deviance. Emotion regulation knowledge did not demonstrate a direct association with interpersonal deviance.

We used hierarchical regression analysis with centered variables to test the hypothesis. In the first step, $\Delta R^2 = .07$, $p < .001$, we regressed interpersonal deviance on gender (coded as 1 = female and 0 = male), $\beta = -.14$, $p < .05$, age, $\beta = -.16$, $p < .05$, and cognitive ability, $\beta = .10$, $p = .12$. In the second step, $\Delta R^2 = .04$, $p = .07$, we added the predictor variable, Machiavellianism, $\beta$
= .23, \( p = .06 \), the moderator variable, emotion regulation knowledge, \( \beta = -.02, p = .75 \), and the three interaction terms between Machiavellianism and gender, \( \beta = -.08, p = .49 \), Machiavellianism and age, \( \beta = -.05, p = .43 \), and Machiavellianism and cognitive ability, \( \beta = .06, p = .30 \). In the final step, \( \Delta R^2 = .03, p < .01 \), we added the interaction term between Machiavellianism and emotion regulation knowledge, which was significant, \( \beta = .16, p < .01 \).

A graph of the interaction (see Figure 2) reveals that as expected, the positive association between Machiavellianism and interpersonal deviance becomes stronger as emotion regulation knowledge increases. The simple slope for the association between Machiavellianism and interpersonal deviance at one standard deviation in emotion regulation knowledge above the mean was positive and significant, \( \beta = .36, p < .001 \). An increase of one unit in Machiavellianism was associated with a .41 increase in interpersonal deviance among high emotion regulation knowledge participants. The simple slope for this association at one standard deviation in emotion regulation knowledge below the mean was not significant, \( \beta = .09, p = .30 \).

Exploratory analyses further revealed that neither cognitive ability nor any of the other EI branches (perceiving, using, or understanding emotions) measured with the MSCEIT moderated the association between Machiavellianism and interpersonal deviance, \( \Delta R^2s = .00 \) to .01, \( \beta s = -.03 \) to .07, \( ps = .29 \) to 92. This increases confidence that the results are driven by emotion regulation knowledge, lending additional support for our theorizing.

The results of our second study paralleled those of Study 1. Emotion regulation knowledge was not directly associated with interpersonal deviance. Rather, it strengthened the positive association between Machiavellianism and interpersonal deviance. Although the studies employed different populations, we do not think this explains why emotion regulation knowledge facilitated prosocial behavior in Study 1 and interpersonal deviance in Study 2. There
is no strong theoretical or empirical rationale to anticipate that emotion regulation knowledge would play a stronger role in interpersonal deviance among older individuals, like the Study 2 participants, than younger individuals. Instead, research on social value orientation and social motivation has documented that individuals tend to become more prosocial as they get older (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997).

**General Discussion**

Claims in the popular press and past research have highlighted the prosocial manifestations of emotion regulation knowledge. Our research presents a more balanced view, and demonstrates that such knowledge has a dark side as well. We developed and tested a new model that positions emotion regulation knowledge as a moderator variable that enhances the effects of both moral identity and Machiavellianism on (anti)social behavior. Our results show that emotion regulation knowledge is itself neither positive nor negative, but can facilitate the objectives of individuals whose interests are in doing harm versus benefiting the greater good.

Emotion regulation knowledge exhibited a positive correlation with moral identity ($r = .26$) in Study 1. It also exhibited a negative correlation with Machiavellianism ($r = -.28$) in Study 2, a result that is consistent with a previous investigation ($r_s = -.22$ and -.25 between the same variables; Austin et al., 2007). These small correlations (using Cohen’s [1988] standard) are not inconsistent with our assertion that emotion regulation knowledge can bring out good or bad behaviors, depending on individuals’ traits. In particular, not all Machiavellians have low emotion regulation knowledge, as suggested by the small overlap between the variables ($r^2 = .08$) in Study 2. Some Machiavellians have high emotion regulation knowledge, and those who do tend to be more interpersonally deviant. Although Machiavellians have low emotion regulation
knowledge on average, Machiavellians who know how to regulate emotions effectively are especially harmful.

The reliability of the measures of emotion regulation knowledge was somewhat low ($\alpha = .61$ in both studies), although typical for these measures. For example, the reliability of the subtest of the MSCEIT used in Study 2 of our investigation was .63 in Lopes et al. (2005). These low levels of reliability likely made our hypothesis tests more conservative.

Our research offers valuable contributions to theory on prosocial behavior and interpersonal deviance. Emotions have become central to our understanding of these behaviors (e.g., Kilduff et al., 2010; Oveis et al., 2010). Our research introduces emotion regulation knowledge to this research, paving a fresh path for understanding how individual variation in such knowledge enables the expression of traits toward (anti)social behavior. Our research also places boundary conditions on the effects of traits on (anti)social behavior by showing that these effects depend on emotion regulation knowledge.

In future research, it would be interesting to examine whether emotion regulation knowledge channels the effects of structural variables such as social power on behavior. For instance, individuals in high power conditions could be expected to claim more value for themselves in negotiations, but perhaps especially when they have sufficient knowledge about how to regulate their emotions to understand exactly how to accomplish this.

Contrary to some previous beliefs (Goleman, 1995), emotion regulation knowledge facilitates both prosocial and interpersonally deviant behavior by enhancing the motivational effects of traits. Brilliant emotional saints are benefited by their knowledge of emotion regulation to behave more prosocially. Evil emotional geniuses are benefited by the same knowledge to perform more interpersonally deviant actions.
References


Footnote

1 The test publisher does not authorize reproduction of actual items from the MSCEIT. Abridged examples of items considered during the development of the MSCEIT appear in Lopes et al. (2005, pp. 114-115).
Table 1

*Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Reliabilities (Study 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.49</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Age</td>
<td>20.23</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Moral identity</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>(.84)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emotion regulation knowledge</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>(.61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Prosocial behavior</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17†</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
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*Note.* $n = 131$. Gender was coded 1 = Female and 0 = Male. Values in parentheses along the diagonal are internal reliability estimates (coefficient alphas). † $p = .05$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. 
Table 2

*Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Reliabilities (Study 2)*

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<td>1. Gender</td>
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<td>.45</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Age</td>
<td>39.29</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3. Cognitive ability</td>
<td>22.67</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>-.24***</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.87)</td>
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<td>4. Machiavellianism</td>
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<td>.62</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.73)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Emotion regulation knowledge</td>
<td>98.44</td>
<td>14.37</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
<td>(.61)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Interpersonal deviance</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>(.77)</td>
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</table>

*Note.* $n = 246$ to 252. Gender was coded 1 = Female and 0 = Male. Values in parentheses along the diagonal are internal reliability estimates (coefficient alphas). *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.}
Figure 1. Higher moral identity is associated with more prosocial behavior among individuals with high emotion regulation knowledge, but not among individuals with low emotion regulation knowledge.
Figure 2. Higher Machiavellianism is associated with more interpersonal deviance among individuals with high emotion regulation knowledge, but not among individuals with low emotion regulation knowledge.
Emotional intelligence is the ability to perceive, manage, and regulate emotions. Learn about the role this can play in relationships and other areas. Côté S, Decelles KA, McCarthy JM, Van Kleef GA, Hideg I. The Jekyll and Hyde of emotional intelligence: emotion-regulation knowledge facilitates both prosocial and interpersonally deviant behavior. Psychol Sci. 2011;22(8):1073-80. doi:10.1177/0956797611416251. Cote, Stephane, Katherine A. DeCelles, Julie M. McCarthy, Gerben A. Van Kleef, and Ivona Hideg. "The Jekyll and Hyde of Emotional Intelligence: Emotion-Regulation Knowledge Facilitates Both Prosocial and Interpersonally Deviant Behavior." Psychological Science 22, no. 8 (2011): 1073-1080. D'Alessandro, Carianne. With regard to emotional intelligence, Daniel Goldman was not the first to articulate the concept. However, in the double role of psychologist and journalist, Goleman made the elements of emotional intelligence accessible to broad segments of society. His best-selling books have already changed how some businesses interact with clients and some managers recruit employees. His impact has been even more profound on education. Get Relevant Teaching Content and Updates Delivered Directly to Your Inbox. Does emotional intelligence promote behavior that strictly benefits the greater good, or can it also advance interpersonal deviance? In the investigation reported here, we tested the possibility that a core facet of emotional intelligence—emotion-regulation knowledge—can promote both prosocial and interpersonally deviant behavior. Keywords emotional intelligence, emotion-regulation knowledge, prosocial behavior, interpersonal deviance. Received 8/23/10; Revision accepted 3/29/11. Emotional intelligence has been overwhelmingly associated with prosociality in the popular press and the academic literature.