Combined with the ‘Augustinus-Literaturdatenbank’ and the CD-Rom Corpus Augustinianum Gissense (CAG 2) the Augustinus-Lexikon continues to be one of the most important tools for the study of Augustine today. The first two fascicles of Volume 3 have appeared in the last few years and the next one is due shortly. Still, the relatively long intervals between fascicles may warrant a temporary update on the content of those that were last published. The lemmata covered by these two fascicles range from figura [C. Mayer] to institutio, institutum [H.A. Gärtner], with Hieronymus (Jerome) [A. Fürst] as interface. (The article extends from cols. 317-336.) The lemma institutio too is split. Only cols. 638-640 are published thus far. The rest will be included in fascicle 4.

The lemmata fall roughly into three categories, 1) prosopographical entries, 2) works of Augustine, 3) ‘things’. A selection of entries from each of these categories may help to illustrate the wealth of knowledge contained in these volumes. Category 1 includes among others, Filastrus Brixiensis [A. Di Berardino, G.J.P. O’Daly] (9-10), Firmus [J. Diviak] (29-32), Hesychius episcopus [J.-P. Bouhot] (312-314), the already mentioned Hieronymus, Hilarius [H.Ch. Brennecke] (341-348), Honoratus [A. Hoffmann] (421-422), Honorius imperator [R. Klein] (423-425), Iamnarius [J. Rexer] (466-468), Iesus [J. Lam Cong Quy] (481-483), and Innocentius episcopus Romanus [M. Lamberigts] (613-619).

Category 2 includes three key works on the interpretation of the book of Genesis, the monumental De genesi ad litteram [R. Teske] (113-126), and the shorter, but also very important De genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus [D. Weber] (126-132), and De Genesi adversus Manicheos [D. Weber] (132-140); and there are entries on lost works including De geometrica [W. Hübner] (151-152), De grammatica [M. Fussl] (175-179), Hermes trismegistus [A. Wlosok] (309-312), Contra Hilarum [M. Klöckner] (348-349), and Cicero’s Hortensius [K. Schlabach] (425-436). Most space is taken up by works on grace, and works related to the Pelagian controversy, including De gestis Pelagii [A. Kessler] (158-167), De gratia Christi et de peccato originali [P.-M. Hombert] (242-253), De gratia et libero arbitrio [V.H. Drecoll] (253-262), and De gratia testamenti novi (= ep. 140) [V. H. Drecoll] (262-270). Also noteworthy are the entries on De immortalitate animae [V.H. Drecoll] (530-534) and Indiculum, -us [F. Dolbeau] (571-581).

Nyssa, and Augustine’s doctrine may be not as great as it may appear. Still, Augustine, punishments (104). It has to be noted, however, that if one uses a concept like ‘eternal’ in but also necessary, a matter of principle. Wlosok points out that this view was not universally but also just the eternal punishment of those who died as sinners was not only deserved by contemporaries of Augustine and by other Christian writers throughout history. Wlosok shows that Augustine had no choice but to deal in a positive way with the Biblical damnation but whose lives had not ended in a perfect state. In her article after a certain time, intended for those whose sins were not grave enough to deserve eternal was by introducing the concept of a purgatory, a kind of eternal punishment that did end shows how Augustine worked himself into an increasingly paradoxical concept, for which shows how Augustine worked himself into an increasingly paradoxical concept, for which shows how Augustine worked himself into an increasingly paradoxical concept, for which shows how Augustine worked himself into an increasingly paradoxical concept, for which

One way of looking at the material gathered in these volumes is by selecting themes, for example Antonie Wlosok’s articles related to the theme of ‘hell’ or ‘eternal damnation’: Gehenna, Ignis purgatorius, and Infernus (inferni) – inferus (inferi). In Gehenna Wlosok begins by outlining the history of the term, its use in Augustine generally, then its detailed use in connection with his discussion of his doctrine of eternal damnation, the fate of the eternally damned, and questions put to this doctrine, generally, and also in particular by contemporaries of Augustine and by other Christian writers throughout history. Wlosok shows how Augustine worked himself into an increasingly paradoxical concept, for which he had to assume eternal but pain-sensitive bodies, temporary interruption and mitigation of eternal punishment, and the apparent cruelty of a supposedly loving and merciful God, only in order to maintain the principle that on the assumption that God is not only merciful but also just the eternal punishment of those who died as sinners was not only deserved but also necessary, a matter of principle. Wlosok points out that this view was not universally accepted. She hints at other concepts which assume the eventual ‘end’ even of ‘eternal’ punishments (104). It has to be noted, however, that if one uses a concept like ‘eternal’ in a philosophical sense and not just in order to stimulate one’s imagination, the difference (in principle) between more ‘apocastatic’ doctrines like, say, that of Origen or Gregory of Nysa, and Augustine’s doctrine may be not as great as it may appear. Still, Augustine, despite insisting that his concern was for the principle, did much to stimulate collective cultural imagination (e. g. with detailed accounts of the ‘fire’ [ignis]), and thus played an important role in the creation of the images of hell that permeated the medieval west.

One way in which the Middle Ages mitigated Augustine’s doctrine of eternal damnation was by introducing the concept of a purgatory, a kind of eternal punishment that did end after a certain time, intended for those whose sins were not grave enough to deserve eternal damnation but whose lives had not ended in a perfect state. In her article ignis purgatorius Wlosok shows that Augustine had no choice but to deal in a positive way with the Biblical evidence for this concept (1 Cor 3:10-15), an otherworldly fire that purifies those who at the point of death are not yet perfect in order that they can then enter eternal salvation,
but that he did so extremely reluctantly. For him purgatory was an hypothesis that had little to do with the reality of the sharp distinction between eternally saved and eternally damned (490). Wlosok therefore ends her article with a question: Is the sometimes held view correct that the medieval doctrine of purgatory originates with Augustine?

By *infernus* (*inferni*) and *inferus* (*inferi*), Wlosok points out, Augustine could mean a number of things, e. g. the realm of the dead and the deceased, and also of demons and spirits, which he held to be real, though not in a material but in a spiritual sense, as well as the inhabitants of that world. It could also be the prison where the fallen angels were held until the last judgment, the lowest part of the universe, which would be wound up at the final judgment when all the damned, angels and men, would be thrown into the eternal fire of the Gehenna.

Numerous cross references indicate how these articles fit into the wider scheme of the ‘Lexikon’, e. g. *finis, descensus, anima, daemon, diabolus* and many others.

Other themes could be approached in a similar way, most obviously the doctrine on *grace*, but also, for example, the themes of *imperium, imperium Romanum, imperatores Romani*, cross-references for which might include *christianus, catholicus, Constantinus imperator, Donatistae, civitas, De civitate Dei* and many others.

Thus these latest two fascicles show once more that even twenty two years after the first fascicle was published this monumental project has lost none of its original quality and vigour, and students of Augustine and Late Antiquity will be keenly expecting the next instalments which are already under way. In the meantime these two volumes can only be warmly recommended for close reading and careful study.

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